A Level Economics · AQA 7136 · Paper 2 · Break It Down
Eight short steps. Start with the knowledge; then each step explains an idea, lets you try it, and checks it with an exam-style question.
Read this first. It takes an energy price shock one step at a time, with the reason for every step: why the 2% target is flexible, how the shock raises prices in a first round that fades by itself, how a second round of pay and price rises can make inflation persist, and why the MPC may look through the first round or aim off the usual path back to 2%. The steps that follow use all of it.
An energy shock is cost-push: SRAS shifts left, so the price level rises while real output falls, and one interest rate cannot push inflation down and growth up at once (the MPC’s dilemma). The first jump is a one-off that fades by itself; the danger is the second round, so the MPC may look through the first round and aim off the usual path back to 2%: returning more slowly to protect output, or tightening more to lean against the second round.
Why it matters: “Should rates rise against cost-push inflation?” is a classic 25-mark question; first v second round, lags and credibility are the evaluation. At 9 and 15 marks, analyse the chains only.
✕ Higher energy prices mean inflation stays high → ✓ a one-off rise drops out after 12 months, because CPI compares with a year ago.
✕ Looking through means ignoring inflation → ✓ it means not reacting to the first round while watching hard for the second.
✕ A rate rise lowers oil prices → ✓ it cuts UK demand, because rates work on AD, not world supply.
✕ Missing 2% breaks the rules → ✓ the remit expects misses after shocks, because holding 2% regardless would swing output.
✕ Second-round effects are the indirect effects → ✓ indirect effects are still first round (costs passed on); the second round is pay and prices reacting to inflation itself.
| 2%, symmetric, at all times | The government’s CPI target. Why symmetric? 1% is as much a miss as 3%: low inflation matters as much as high. |
| “In the medium term” | The MPC aims to get back to 2% sustainably over time. Why not at once? Rates take about 18–24 months to work, so it steers by its forecast about two years ahead. |
| Misses are expected | The remit accepts inflation will depart from 2% after shocks. Why? Holding 2% regardless “may cause undesirable volatility in output”. |
| Flexible targeting | So the MPC chooses how fast to return to 2%. Why? It weighs inflation against lost output and jobs: subject to price stability, it supports the government’s aims for growth and jobs. |
| Open letter | If CPI is more than 1 point from target, the Governor writes to the Chancellor: why, what the MPC is doing, how long the return will take and the trade-off with output. Why? Flexibility with accountability, which protects credibility. |
CPI 3.5%, Bank Rate 3.75% (data below). Markets and most economists expected a rise to 4%. The MPC’s decision: Up to 4%, voted 8–1 (Mann wanted 4.25%). Little sign of second-round effects yet, but the risk had risen, so the MPC leaned against it.
SRAS → SRAS₁: price level up (P₁), real GDP down (Y₁): a one-off rise in the level.
Pay chases prices: SRAS₁ → SRAS₂. The price level keeps rising (P₂): persistent inflation.
Rates up: AD → AD₁. A lower price level (P₂) only by cutting output further (Y₂).
Expected inflation 2% → 4%: SRPC₁ (A → B). Forcing 2% now (C) costs unemployment U₁.
Lags. A rate rise today bites in about 18–24 months, by when the first-round jump has dropped out of the 12-month rate. It would cut output and jobs after the shock had faded: an extra loss for no lasting gain, like braking for a bend you have already driven round. But only while the second round stays away: in July 2026 members “continued to look through direct effects”, with “little evidence” of second-round effects so far.
In plain words: the MPC deliberately sets rates so that inflation is not brought back to 2% on the usual timetable. It aims to one side on purpose, as a walker with a map aims to one side of a bridge so they know which way to turn.
| Direction | What the MPC does, and why · what it costs |
|---|---|
| Slower return | Accepts inflation above 2% for longer, so it can avoid a deep recession. Cost: inflation stays high for longer, and credibility may slip. |
| Lean against | Tightens more than its central forecast alone needs, as insurance against second-round effects. Why? Risk management: if the second round takes hold, doing too little costs more than doing too much. Cost: output and jobs lost now, perhaps for nothing if the second round never comes. |
Careful: “aiming off” is not the Bank of England’s phrase (it is not in the remit or the minutes). It labels the choice the remit gives the MPC over “the speed with which it aims to bring inflation back to the target”. The Bank and MPC members say look through, lean against, medium term, risk management.
Wrong side of the diagram: it shifts AD; it cannot add energy supply or lower world oil prices.
Hits everyone: borrowers, mortgage holders and firms’ investment, already squeezed by dearer energy.
Long, variable lags; most mortgages are fixed, so a rise reaches many households only when their deal ends.
The one channel to import prices: higher rates → hot money → £ appreciates → oil and imports cheaper in £.
Better partners: fiscal support targeted at poorer households; supply-side policy (insulation, renewables); energy security (storage, more home supply).
| Pay | Pay settlements and regular pay growth (3.7%). Pay rising faster than productivity pushes up firms’ costs. |
| Services | Services inflation (3.7%). Services are mostly labour, so they track pay, not oil. |
| Firms | Own-price expectations in the Bank’s Decision Maker Panel (DMP) survey. What firms plan to charge next year. |
| Households | Household inflation expectations. What they expect goes into pay claims. |
| Core | Core CPI, without energy, food, alcohol and tobacco (2.8%). If core rises, the shock is spreading. |
Readings: ONS, Oct 2026. July 2026 minutes: “little evidence of material second-round effects so far”; some members saw no adverse moves yet in expectations or DMP price plans.
| Inflation | CPI 3.5% in Sept 2026, up from 3.1% (CPIH 3.6%); core 2.8%, services 3.7%, goods 3.2%. Motor fuels +29.8% in a year; transport added 0.94 percentage points (ONS, 21 Oct 2026). |
| The shock | Middle East conflict involving Iran: Brent crude above $100 a barrel, over $110 by the end of Oct 2026. |
| Bank Rate | 3.75%, held on 17 Sept 2026 by 6–3: Greene, Mann and Pill voted for 4%. The Bank warned CPI could go slightly over 4% in early 2027. |
| Jobs, pay | Unemployment 4.7%; regular pay growth 3.7% (three months to Aug 2026). |
Say the definition out loud, then tap each card to check. 0 of 11 checked.
Choose the size of the energy shock, how wage-setters react (do they trust the 2% target, or chase past inflation?) and the MPC’s policy. Then step through 16 quarters (4 years) and watch inflation, the output gap, unemployment and Bank Rate. The verdict explains what happened and why. The model is simple and illustrative: it starts at the 2% target and Bank Rate 3.75% (its level before today’s meeting), so you can see the shock on its own.
An energy shock adds to CPI at once (direct) and then through costs passed on (indirect). After about a year the base effect drops it out, so if wage-setters trust 2% inflation falls back by itself.
If they chase past inflation, a second round keeps inflation up. The MPC’s choice is a trade-off: looking through protects output; raising rates fights inflation but costs jobs.
CPI inflation was 3.5% in Sept 2026 and Bank Rate 3.75%; markets and most economists (54 of 63 in a Reuters poll, 12–14 Oct) expected a rise to 4%. The MPC’s decision: Up to 4%, voted 8–1 (Mann wanted 4.25%). Little sign of second-round effects yet, but the risk had risen, so the MPC leaned against it.
The minutes record what the nine MPC members discussed and why each voted as they did. Each point below connects to an idea in this lesson.
Second-round effects: there was still limited evidence of them, but the Committee judged that the risk of them had risen since September.
Lean against: a rise as insurance before the second round arrives.Expectations: indicators of pay and price expectations had moved little since September.
Credibility: expectations still anchored, so most members thought a small rise was enough.The blunt tool: monetary policy cannot influence global energy prices.
Bank Rate works on AD, not on world energy supply.The trade-off: members expect growth to fall back somewhat in the coming quarters, and weighed that against the inflation risk.
The dilemma: cost-push inflation raises prices and cuts output at the same time.Pay and services: Megan Greene said underlying wage growth is stuck around 3.5% and underlying services inflation has been flat since spring; Alan Taylor pointed to the 2027 pay round.
The evidence the MPC watches: pay, services and the next pay round.The vote against (4.25%): Catherine Mann wanted a more activist approach, so that persistent inflation could not become embedded. She projects CPI inflation reaching 4.9% by mid-2027, and notes that households pay particular attention to energy and food prices.
Leaning against harder: households who notice energy and food prices may raise their expectations (a second round).What next: Huw Pill said one 0.25-point rise is unlikely to be enough; Andrew Bailey and Clare Lombardelli saw a case for a further rise if the risks do not ease. The Bank says policy is not on a pre-set path.
Data dependence: evidence of a second round decides the path.Leaning against, gently. The MPC raised Bank Rate before there was clear evidence of second-round effects, as insurance, because it judged that the risk of them had risen. It did not look through, and it did not choose a slower return.
Mann leaned harder. She expects inflation to rise further (4.9% by mid-2027) and worries that households, who notice energy and food prices most, will start to expect higher inflation. A bigger rise now is meant to stop that second round before it starts. The cost: more lost output and jobs if the second round never comes.
Using it in an exam: one point from the minutes makes strong evaluation. For example: “In November 2026 the MPC raised Bank Rate to 4% even though there was still limited evidence of second-round effects, because it judged the risk of them had risen: it leaned against the second round rather than looking through.”
Source: Bank of England, Monetary Policy Summary and minutes, 5 November 2026.
Energy: the shock adds 60% of its size to CPI at once (direct: fuel and bills) for four quarters, and 40% from quarter 2 to 5 (indirect: costs passed on). Then the base effect drops it out.
Expectations: expected inflation = c × 2% + (1 − c) × last quarter’s inflation, with c = 0.8 if wage-setters trust the target and 0.3 if they chase past inflation.
Phillips curve (A level): inflation = expected inflation + 0.25 × last quarter’s output gap + energy.
Output gap: 0.7 × last quarter’s gap − 0.2 × (real interest rate two quarters ago − 1.75) − 0.25 × shock (while energy is dear). Real rate = Bank Rate − expected inflation. Unemployment = 4.7% − 0.5 × output gap.
Policies: look through holds 3.75%; slower return adds 0.5 × (underlying inflation − 2); lean against adds 0.5 for six quarters plus 1.5 × (underlying − 2); raise now adds 1.5 × (headline − 2). Underlying = headline minus the energy effect. Bank Rate is rounded to 0.25 and kept between 0.25% and 9%.
Each card is one step in the story, from the 2% target to the MPC’s choice. Choose the reason it is like that, then read the explanation: the reasons are what turn a list of effects into analysis.
Every step has a reason. The target is flexible because holding 2% regardless would swing output. The first round fades because CPI compares with a year ago. The second round persists because pay and expectations chase prices.
The MPC looks through because of lags, and Bank Rate is blunt because it works on AD, not energy supply.
The target is flexible: 2% is symmetric and applies at all times, but the remit expects misses after shocks, because holding 2% regardless “may cause undesirable volatility in output”. An open letter keeps the MPC accountable.
First round: energy is in the CPI basket (direct) and in firms’ costs (indirect). It is a one-off rise in the price level that drops out after 12 months.
Second round: pay chases prices to restore real wages, firms protect margins, and expectations de-anchor: inflation persists. Higher money pay can also lift consumption and AD (demand-pull on top), but by much only if real pay rises.
The choice: look through (lags of 18–24 months), aim off (slower return, or lean against as insurance), or raise now. Bank Rate works on AD, not on energy supply.
For each case, follow the story in your head and predict what happens, then check the reason. Watch for the things that do not move, like world oil prices after a UK rate rise.
To predict, ask: is this the first round (energy itself) or the second round (pay and prices reacting)? What can Bank Rate reach, and what can it not?
A UK rate rise does not change world oil prices; it does lift the £, raise unemployment and, over time, lower demand-driven inflation.
Score: 0 / 0
Five kinds of sum the MPC uses all the time: inflation from a price index (and the base effect), the real interest rate, real pay growth, the gap from target, and an item’s contribution to CPI. Watch the units: a gap between two rates is in percentage points.
Inflation = (index this year − index last year) ÷ index last year × 100. Real interest rate = Bank Rate − inflation; real pay growth ≈ pay growth − inflation.
A gap between two rates, or an item’s contribution to CPI (weight × price change ÷ 100), is in percentage points.
Score this session: 0 / 0 marks · answers to 2 decimal places.
The evaluation questions this topic leads to. Try each one first, then reveal the knowledge points.
Raising rates against cost-push inflation makes sense when second-round effects are visible or expectations are slipping, and the shock is large and lasting.
It makes less sense for a one-off shock with anchored expectations, a weak economy and long lags. Aiming off has a cost in both directions: slower return risks credibility; leaning against costs output.
Should the MPC raise interest rates in response to cost-push inflation?
Try it first. Is the inflation a one-off or spreading? What can Bank Rate reach, and how fast?
After an energy shock, should the MPC aim off, accepting a slower return to 2%, rather than bring inflation back as fast as possible?
Try it first. What does a fast return cost, and what could go wrong with a slow one?
Put the sentences in the order of the frame: what happens, why it happens, the consequence, then what it might mean. Then read the evaluation, which works back along the same chain.
Use the frame: In this case (what happens), This is because (its cause), As a consequence (what follows), This might mean (a further effect, going beyond sentence 1).
Evaluate back along the chain: bargaining power and credibility, fixed mortgages and lags, and whether the shock is a one-off.
Exam-style questions on this topic. AQA marks extended answers by levels. 9 marks: Level 3 7–9 · L2 4–6 · L1 1–3. 15 marks: L3 11–15 · L2 6–10 · L1 1–5. 25 marks: L5 21–25 · L4 16–20 · L3 11–15 · L2 6–10 · L1 1–5. Evaluation is not needed at 9 or 15 marks; save it for the 25. Write your answer, then open "What gets the marks" to check it. Tick each one when you’ve done it.
Multiple-choice and short questions reward precise facts and units: percentage points for gaps, real rate = nominal − inflation. 4-mark explain questions need a full chain, using the data.
At 9 and 15 marks, analyse with an AD/AS diagram and no evaluation. At 25, add evaluation to each point (one-off v persistent, second-round evidence, credibility, the output gap, lags, the £, fiscal policy), then a conclusion: answer, weigh, depends upon, still decide.
MCQ 1 mark (Paper 3 and AS papers): first or second round; a real interest rate; what a supply shock does on AD/AS.
2 · 4 Define second-round effects, or calculate a real rate, real pay growth or a gap in percentage points (2); explain one full link using the data: energy → SRAS → price level, or real pay → pay claims → costs → prices (4).
9 · 15 Explain or analyse with an AD/AS diagram: first and second round, a rate rise against cost-push, why the MPC looks through. No evaluation at 9 or 15 marks.
25 Evaluate: an introduction, two or three points each with evaluation (one-off v persistent, second-round evidence, credibility, the output gap, lags, the £, fiscal policy), then a conclusion: answer, weigh, depends upon, still decide.
Traps: say whether inflation is demand-pull or cost-push before you prescribe rates; indirect effects are still first round; a gap between rates is in percentage points; “aiming off” is a label, not the Bank’s term; no evaluation at 9 or 15 marks (save it for the 25).